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NO. 1

HOW TO BAR AN UNINNOCENT INVESTOR- THE
VALIDITY OF COMMON LAW DEFENSES TO PRIVATE
ACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934*
JOHN P. A. BELL**
We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad
common-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important
public purposes.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for
the United States Supreme Court
in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corporation'
-

The concept of barring a plaintiff's right to recovery because of his own
wrongful conduct is familiar in our common law heritage.2 However, the
validity of "broad common-law barriers," such as in pari delicto or "unclean
hands," as defenses to private claims for relief under the Securities Exchange
Act of 19343 has been brought into sharp focus as a result of Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corporation4 and other United States
Supreme Court decisions. 5 This development is also reflected in recent securi*The author is deeply indebted to Mr. Richard H. Hunt, Jr., Miami, Florida, for his
advice in the preparation of this article, and to professor James S. Mofsky, University of
Miami Law School, and Mr. Michael R. Storace, Miami, Florida, for their comments.
**B.A. 1964, University of South Florida; M.A. 1969, Case Western Reserve University;
LL.B. 1969, University of Virginia; Member of The Florida Bar.
Since writing this article, the author has become employed as an attorney with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Trading and Markets,
Miami, Florida, Branch Office. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any of its employees. The
views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Perma Life]. The statement was made
in regard to the asserted common law defense of in pari delicto.
2. In regard to in pari delicto and "unclean hands," the defenses with which this
article is primarily concerned, see 2, 3 J. PoMERoy, EQurrY JuRispRuDEN E §§940-42, at 397403 (5th ed. 1941).
3. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78hh (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1934 Act]. The Securities Act of 1933 is included within 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77bbbb (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act].
4. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
5. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 306
(2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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ties cases reacting to the Supreme Court decisions, notably Serzysko v. Chase
7
Manhattan Bank8 and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation, which attempt to
s
reconcile the statutory rationales of 'full disclosure" and "private suits
serving important public purposes" with common law concepts of inequitable
or unfair conduct.
Assume two fact situations. The first involves Mr. Kuehnert, who has
some money and believes that investing in securities is a sound means of
generating income and protecting himself against inflation. A friend, Mr.
Rhame, who is also the president of Texstar Corporation, visits with
Kuehnert one balmy evening and offers him some "hot" inside information:
Texstar is acquiring an oil company, and some secret discoveries, which will
dramatically increase Texstar's value, have been made on recently acquired
land. Consequently, Kuehnert buys as much Texstar stock as he can, even to
the extent of purchasing on margin or credit, but neglecting to tell the good
news to any of the persons from whom he purchases Texstar. Unfortunately,
however, Rhame's "hot" tip had been misleading. The price of Texstar drops
and Kuehnert, unable to maintain the legally required amounts of cash or
acceptable securities in his margin account, is sold out by his broker. Kuehnert reconsiders his friendship with Rhame and subsequently sues him and
Texstar for fraud. In response, the defendants contend that Kuehnert should
not be allowed to recover any damages because he also had violated the
law and thus is barred by the common law doctrines of unclean hands and
in pari delicto (of equal fault).10 Should Kuehnert's conduct bar his
recovery? Upon what bases should such a determination be made? What
factors should be relevant in making this decision?
In the second case, a Mr. Moscarelli and friends contrived with their
brokers and decided they could make a "killing" in the stock market by
speculating in certain securities. To finance their purchases they set up
margin accounts, blissfully ignoring the requirements regulating such
accounts. Eventually, other officials of the brokerage firm learned of the
venture and demanded compliance with the margin requirements. When
6. 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 904 (1969).
7. 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd and petition for rehearing denied en banc,
412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
8. "The keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is disclosure."
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARErs OF THE SEcURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N,

H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1 (1963): "Based upon facts and views
elicited in the comprehensive investigations which led to the Securities Act and in other
investigations, the Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and extended the
'disclosure' doctrine of investor protection to securities listed on national (registered) securities exchanges." Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities,
28 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 118, 156 (1959). See also Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 214 (1959); Tracy
& McChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REv. 1025 (1934); Corporate Democracy, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Comp. (1953).
9. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
10. These facts and allegations are derived from Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F.
Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
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Moscarelli and friends could not furnish the necessary funds, the firm sold
the securities, causing the venture's immediate demise. Moscarelli and his
friends, claiming that certain employees of the defendant brokerage firm
had told them not to worry about trivia such as margin requirements,
sued the firm on the ground, among others, that it had fraudulently encouraged and permitted the investors to purchase and sell securities in
violation of the prescribed margin rules. In response, the defendants (partners
of the firm) argued that recovery was barred by the plaintiffs' active participation in a conspiracy to violate the law.'1 Should the plaintiffs be
allowed to recover or should their claim for relief be barred because of
wrongful conduct? Should unclean hands and in pari delicto be applicable?
What considerations and factors should be dispositive?
These contexts are far from imaginary. They represent actual cases that
considered the circumstances in which a plaintiff should be barred under the
1934 Act. This question is complicated because of the legislative character
of the Securities Acts, the lack of statutory language indicating legislative
intent, and because any analysis must carefully consider rationales followed
by the United States Supreme Court in securities and analogous antitrust
contexts.1

2

Since understanding the reasoning employed by the Court is vital

in establishing criteria for the future development and prediction of case law
and because of the far-reaching economic implications of these decisions,
this article will focus in detail upon the reasoning processes employed in the
relevant decisions in order to assess the validity of common law defenses to
private actions under the 1934 Act.
Initially, this article discusses the status of common law defenses to
securities claims under various state laws prior to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. It then analyzes rationales adopted by the Supreme Court after
passage of the Act and relating to a typical broad common law defense
asserted in the context of federal antitrust legislation. The interaction, sometimes conflicting, of our common law heritage and modem statutory philosophies is especially conspicuous in these cases involving federal regulatory
legislation of overriding public importance. Later sections discuss judicial
responses to the Supreme Court cases, including the analytical approaches
employed, and synthesize the present law, setting forth an analytical framework to deal with future securities cases involving claims that a plaintiff
should be barred because of his wrongful conduct.
BACKGROUND: TIE EARLY CASES UNDER STATE LAWS

Discussing the judicial approach to statutory construction, Professor Louis
Loss observed that statutes "build on the common law and, especially when
statutes are new, judges and lawyers who are trained in the common law
are apt to look to it for guidance."' 3 The Securities Acts are no longer new,
11. These facts and arguments are taken from Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
12. See cases cited notes 1, 6, 7 supra.
13. 3 L. Loss, SEcuRiTiEs REGULATION 1430 (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss].
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yet the question of the applicability of "broad common-law barriers"',
to claims under them remains unresolved. The Supreme Court has exhibited
a decided hostility to these defenses in regard to antitrust legislation. 5
However, before reaching the issues and implications raised by such decisions,
the case-law development prior to the enactment of the Securities Acts
(1933-1940) should be noted.
In discussing civil liabilities under the "blue sky" or state securities
laws,"6 Professor Loss states that broad common law defenses such as
ratification, waiver, estoppel, and laches are "an inheritance from an earlier
day"17 and are "largely carryovers from non-statutory rescission traditions."' s
However, even under state laws, the "buyer's mere knowledge of the violation of the blue sky statute at the time of his purchase will not generally
saddle him with the status of one in pari delicto whom the courts will not
assist, although there may be exceptional circumstances."' 19 The state courts
seem usually to have held that such exceptional circumstances existed only
if the plaintiff had actively participated in the statutory violation; however,
the courts seemed more disposed to find such circumstances if he had been
20
an officer of the defendant company.
Because of the broad remedial purposes of the Securities Acts, common
law defenses such as in pari delicto would seem logically and reasonably
applicable only in accordance with the narrowest common law views, if at
all. 2 But in Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corporation22 the
(1933), for an
excellent discussion of the differences between common law deceit and the statutory provisions of the 1933 Act.
14. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
Although some of these defenses originated in equity, the Court's usage of the term "common law barriers" will be used herein. See also note 2 supra.
15. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
16. It should be remembered that the regulation of securities always occurs on two
levels: federal and state. These regulations often contain similar language but may contain inconsistencies and even conflicts. See, e.g., L. Loss & E Cowmr, BLUE SKY LAW (1958);
See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227

Brainin & Davis, State Regulation of the Sale of Securities, 14 Bus. LAw. 456 (1959);
Mofsky, Reform of the Blue Sky Laws, 23 VAND. L. Rxv. 599 (1970).

17. 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1676-77.
18. 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1671.
19. 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1677 (numerous citations are given).
20. 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1676-80. See generally Note, Denying Purchasers the
Assertion of Illegality Under Blue Sky Laws, 42 VA. L. Rxv. 205 (1956). Compare the

"active participation" concept to Mr. Justice Black's remarks in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
21. "Now there are superimposed on this common law background the several antifraud
provisions of the SEC statutes. It is obvious from the language that some of the basic
problems are the same-what is false, what is a fact, what is material. Because of the
legislative background it seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the most liberal
common law views on these questions should govern under the statutes." 3 L. Loss, supra
note 13, at 1435. See also Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883,
884-87 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting).
22. 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'g 182 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1960). On remand,
however, the lower court held such defenses were not proved and the court of appeals
affirmed, 312 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1962).
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United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held in 1961 that estoppel
and waiver were allowable defenses to a claim under section 12 (1) of the
1933 Act. Shortly thereafter, in Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,23 the
same court allowed estoppel, waiver, and laches to be interposed against
a claim under rule 101>5 of the 1934 Act. The court's reasoning in these two
opinions formulates the basic argument for allowing such defenses.
In Straley24 the plaintiff sued to recover consideration he had paid for
unregistered securities. The trial court decided that laches could be asserted
to bar the plaintiff's right to recovery; however, the court of appeals
reversed. 25 The court reasoned that the "basic purpose and intent of
Congress in enacting the Securities Act of 1933 was to protect innocent
purchasers of securities and the provisions of the Act had to be construed
in light of such intent and purposes." 2 6 This premise derived from the
opinion in A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corporation,27
wherein Mr. Justice McReynolds stated: 28
Courts have often added a sanction to those prescribed for an
offense created by statute where the circumstances fairly indicated
this would further the essential purpose of the enactment; but we
think where the contrary definitely appears -actual hindrance indeed
of that purpose - no such addition is permissible. The latter situation
is beyond the reason which supports the doctrine now relied upon.
Here the clear legislative purpose [of the 1933 Securities Act] was
protection of innocent purchasers of securities.
Having cited the "essential purpose" standard enunciated in Frost, the
Straley court rejected the lower court's analysis that construed the section 12
remedy provided under the 1933 Act 29 to be essentially in equity. 30 Viewing
23. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
24. 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 372.
27. 312 U.S. 38 (1940), rev'g 98 P.2d 965 (1939). See 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at
1799-1805.
28. A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 812 U.S. 38, 43 (1940). In its
memorandum, the SEC had argued that the "fundamental purpose" of the 1933 Act was
"to protect the investing public" and furthermore, that the labels of "void" or "in pari
delicto" merely "state the conclusions reached, but do not aid in solution of the problem.
The ultimate issue is whether the result in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate
the purposes of the Act." Id., n.2.
29. Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §771 (1964) states: "Any person who (1)
offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or (2) offers or sells a
security . . . by the use of any means .

.

. which includes an untrue statement of a ma-

terial fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements . . .
not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity .... "
30. 182 F. Supp. 940, 942 (S.D. Cal. 1960). "The Securities Act itself is silent as to
whether laches can be a defense, but since the remedy provided by the Act is essentially one
of rescission the silence of Congress should be construed, in my opinion, as indicating that
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the broad language of that section, 3 ' the court declared that the selection
of a legal or equitable remedy "depends upon the nature of the relief which
the aggrieved person seeks, and not from the statute which creates the right
to sue either in law or in equity.13 2 Since the appellants sought only money
damages, the court conduded that their daim for relief was at law and
that the purely equitable defense of laches was not allowable.33 However,
the court noted that the defendants had also interposed the affirmative
common law defenses of waiver and estoppel and, reasoning that those
defenses were available to a defendant in an action on a contract declared
voidable at common law, found "no reason why such defenses would not
likewise be available to one against whom an action is brought on a contract
declared voidable by judicial construction of a statute."34 The court utilized
this common law analogy after concluding that congressional silence on
the question did not seem to indicate an intention to make such defenses
all existing defenses to a claim for rescission [of an agreement which was voidable at its
inception] including laches, should apply. Such a construction does not emasculate the
legislative purpose or cause noxious consequences: the mere fact that a particular investor's

remedy is barred does not mean that private investors worthy of protection are barred." Id.
Instead of delving into the morass of "broad common law" doctrine such as laches,
estoppel, and waiver, would it not have been sounder for the court to approach the problem as a matter of legislative policy? In this regard see Comment, Applicability of Waiver,
Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and SEC 1OB-5;
Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964), in which it is argued that
cases such as Straley and Royal Air have "failed adequately to recognize the possible conflict between the general in terrorem function of the act and the allowance of these defenses, which are normally available in civil actions to assure equitable treatment of the
parties." Id. at 1478. Thus, the author would analyze a given section to determine which
function-deterrence or remedy-is more central to its purpose, and whether allowance of
the defense asserted is consistent with such purpose. Remedial aspects of the statutes are
described as those having a "primary concern for redress of harm already incurred rather
than for the prevention of future violations through inculcation of fear . . . .. the latter
aspect being in terrorem.Id. at 1481.
31. 15 U.S.C. §771 (1964).
32. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Mining Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961). See
also Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1940), wherein the
United States Supreme Court stated that the 1933 Act "as a whole indicates an intention
to establish a statutory right which the litigant may enforce in designated courts by such
legal or equitable actions or procedures as would normally be available to him."
33. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Mining Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961).
34. Id. at 373. But see Comment, note 30 supra, which concludes that because "of
the importance placed on the deterrent nature [of §12(1)], and in the absence of competing considerations, the defenses of waiver, estoppel and laches should not be allowed."
Id. at 1483. However, after analyzing §12(2), the author concluded there is a "de-emphasis
of the deterrent function," that the subsection is "basically a statutory counterpart to
common law rescission" and thus "primarily remedial," and that therefore the allowance
of such defenses "appears" to be harmonious with the policy of such subsection. Id. at
1484-86. The author qualifies his conclusions, however, by adding that "in order to maintain this ambivalent statutory policy [deterrence-remedial], a court should not relax the
common law requisites of the various defenses; such relaxation might well undercut the
basic protective policy of the Act and thwart the subsidiary deterrent function of Section
12(2)." Id. at 1486. In other words, even if such defenses are allowed, they should be
interpreted so as to require strict proof of all elements.
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unavailable. Since the Securities Acts involve important public policies and
purposes - including "ideal" concepts of fiduciary behavior, safeguarding the
economy, and disclosure 5 - and since they were intended dearly to reach
beyond the inadequacies of the common law36 so simplistic a conclusion
seems debatable. 37
The following year in Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smiths the same
court followed Straley in holding that not only waiver and estoppel but
also laches constituted valid defenses to civil actions brought under sections
10 (b) and 29 (b) of the 1934 Act.39 The court noted that, although Congress
expressly provided in section 12 a civil remedy for violation of section 5
of the 1934 Act, it did not provide a remedy for violation of section 10 (b).
Since the courts had to imply such civil liability judicially, it followed that
"appropriate" common law defenses should also be allowed. 40 Furthermore,
since the Straley court had allowed estoppel and waiver defenses under the
1933 Act, it would have been inconsistent for the same court not to allow
them against claims under the 1934 Act.4 1 Thus, the court argued that since
courts generally interpreted statutes in the context of the common law and
since Congress had not specifically denied such defenses, there seemed to be
no reason why they should not be allowed. This conclusion was buttressed
by the statement that the purpose of the 1934 Act "is to protect the innocent
investor, not one who loses his innocence and then waits to see how his
'42
investment turns out before he decides to invoke the provisions of the Act.
35. See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 21-22.
36. Id. at 20. See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1430-44, for a discussion on the
relation between common law deceit and SEC fraud concepts.
37. See notes 35-56 supra.
38. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). On remand, as in Straley, the trial court held that
the defenses, although allowable, were not established by the evidence and the case was
affirmed in the second appeal, 333 F-.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
39. Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j (1964), makes it unlawful: "To use or
employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ......
Rule lob-5 enacted in accordance with §10(b), 17 C.F.R. §240, 10b-5 (1970), states: "It
shall be unlawful for any person . . . (a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading, or (c) to engage
in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78cc (1964), declares: "Every contract made in
violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every
contract . .. the performance of which involves the violation of .

.

. this chapter or any

rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void (1)as regards the rights of any person who ...
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards
the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired
any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making
or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulations

.. "

40. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
41. "It would be inconsistent to apply those defenses to a remedy specifically provided
by Congress and not to a remedy judicially inferred from an act of Congress." Id.
42. Id. at 213-14. See note 28 supra; Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 615 (D.Mass.
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Even if one agrees with the assumption that "appropriate" common law
defenses should be allowable against implied rights of action and that a
lack of express congressional prohibition constitutes rational grounds for
their allowance, is it a necessary conclusion that common law concepts such
as estoppel and waiver apply en toto to legislation enacted specifically to
avoid common law technicalities? Is legislative silence a sound basis for
implying legislative approval? If, as stated in both Straley and Royal Air,
the court's analysis was based upon the purposes and intent of the Securities
Acts, then it would seem that the applicability of certain defenses should
turn not upon their availability at common law but rather upon whether
their allowance would tend to effectuate or derogate the purposes and policies
of the Acts. Viewing the Securities Acts as basically remedial legislation
designed to protect important individual and public interests, it is submitted that the issue is not what "appropriate" common law defenses might
be available by analogy but whether such defenses are appropriate in light
of the rationales underlying the securities laws. 43 If the courts do in fact
follow the latter rationale, analogies to common law principles are confusing
to future litigants and unnecessary.
THE Capital Gains, Borak, AND Perma Life DECIsIONs
Any discussion of the circumstances under which a plaintiff will be
barred from recovery under the Securities Act (in contrast to a claim
under common law) must analyze several Supreme Court decisions that
directly or impliedly consider the relationships between common law concepts
and the rationales underlying the Securities Acts.
Although Securities & Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau44 ostensibly dealt with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Court
discussed purposes common to all of the Securities Acts. Since the Court
dealt directly with common law concepts in the securities context, this case
has a significant bearing upon the problem presented in this article. In
Capital Gains the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to compel a
registered investment adviser to disclose to his clients his practice of purchasing securities for his own account shortly before recommending them for
1955); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 187 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Mass. 1955) (companion
case to Carr); cf. Goldenberg v. Bache :Co., 270 F.2d 675-81 (5th Cir. 1959).
45. See notes 31, 35 supra and the premise stated therein. Several cases subsequent to
Straley and Royal Air have allowed these same defenses in principle, usually on the authority of Royal Air, but none have discussed the policy considerations inherent in this
problem. In Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Mont. 1964), a claim under the
1933 Act, the court stated simply that "[Tihe defense of estoppel is available in a Securities
Act case." In Moran v. Paine, 279 F. Supp. 573, 578 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d
242 (3d Cir. 1968), the court noted in dicta that a "variety of cases has sustained defenses
of this nature," such as estoppel and res judicata. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D.Cal. 1968), the court allowed such defenses, combining the
reasoning of Royal Air and the cases cited in note 43 supra. See also Marth v. Industrial
Incomes, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 755, 757-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and the citations given in 6 L. Loss,
supra note 13, at 3888-90.
44. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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long-term investments, and then selling his shares at a profit. The district
court refused to enter an injunction, holding that the terms "fraud" and
"deceit" in the statute were used in their technical, common law sense, thus
requiring proof of intent to injure and actual injury. The Commission had
shown neither.4 5 In a 5-4 decision, the court of appeals affirmed, similarly
construing the Act as bound by traditional common law concepts of fraud
and deceit. 40 Judge Clark, dissenting, argued that the general antifraud
sections of the Securities Acts should be liberally construed to effectuate their
broad remedial purpose and not constricted to the narrow confines of
47
common law ideology. He explained his decision in part by noting:
The common-law doctrines of fraud and deceit grew up in a
business climate very different from that involved in the sale of
securities, and the rigors of those doctrines were ill fitted to regulation
of the sale of this unique and intricate merchandise.
Although these statements refer to claims for relief, such statements should
apply with equal force to broad common law defenses such as in pari delicto
and unclean hands.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, agreeing with the
four dissenting judges on the court of appeals. The Court directly underscored the relationships between common law principles of fraud and its
legislative codification in the Securities Acts: 48
The decision in this case turns on whether Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates "as a fraud or
deceit upon any client or prospective client," intended to require the
Commission to establish fraud and deceit "in their technical sense,"
including intent to injure and actual injury to clients, or whether
Congress intended a broad remedial construction of the Act which
would encompass nondisclosure of material facts. For resolution of
this issue we consider the history and purpose of the . . . Act ....
After noting that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was the last in a
49
series of legislation designed to eliminate abuses in the securities industry,
50
the Court made a far-reaching statement:
A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry.
45.

191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 875 U.S.

180 (1968).
46. 806 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962).
47. Id. at 614.
48. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 575 U.S. 180, 185-86 (1968).
49. See generally Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 48 YALE L.J.
171 (1933); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 28 G~o. WAsH. L. Ray. 214 (1959); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act,
43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933); cf. J. GALBRArH, Tna GRFAT CRASH (1955).
50. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 875 U.S. 180, 185-86 (1963).
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The Court concluded that requiring strict proof of traditional common law
elements of fraud and deceit would undermine such manifest purposes. This
conclusion was not felt to derogate the common law process "by which the
courts have adapted the common law of fraud to the commercial transactions
of our society." 51 Viewing the development of common law concepts as an
evolutionary process molded to meet the needs of society, the Court explained
that the concepts of fraud under our laws have changed in accordance with
such variables as (a) the nature of the relief sought, (b) the relationship
between the parties, and (c) the merchandise in issue.5 2 In addition, the
opinion pointed out that Congress, although silent concerning these developments, was probably aware of them and thus likely intended to codify
common law concepts "remedially" rather than technically since the Securities Acts were basically remedial in nature. 53
In view of these Supreme Court declarations, approaching the issue of
common law defenses under the Securities Acts in terms of congressional
purposes and policies is clearly favored over attempting to imply congressional
intent on the grounds of common law analogies and legislative silence.
Silence, by its nature, rarely provides a meaningful answer to problems;
moreover, the alleged common law analogies evolved in contexts different
from and antithetical to the securities arena where societal demands have
forced investor protection by legislation.54 As the Supreme Court stated in
another leading securities case, the details of a statute will be construed
"in conformity with [their] dominating general purpose . . . to carry out
in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy."'5
In J.L Case v. Borak,56 the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that a merger
was effected by utilizing a false and misleading proxy statement, thus violating
section 14 (a)57 of the 1934 Act. The trial court declared that it was limited
to the granting of declaratory relief under section 27,58 the jurisdictional
section. The court of appeals reversed and was affirmed by the United States
51. Id. at 192.
52. Id. at 193.
53. "Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other
securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195 (1963). See authorities cited note 49 supra.
54. See Fleischer, "Federal CorporationLai": an Assessment, in SECL-r AixmcmS ON
SEcuFrriEs LAW 871, 890-900 (W. Grieneberger & H. Wander ed. 1968) (published
by ABA Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law); Painter, Civil Liabilities
FEDERAL

and Administrative Sanctions Under the Securities Act of 1933, id at 257-68.

55. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
56. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
57. Section 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78n (a) (Supp.
IV, 1968), provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . .in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . .to solicit or to permit the use
of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other
than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title."
58. Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1964), provides in part:
"The district courts . . .shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits . . .brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder ....."
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Supreme Court on certiorari. What is important here is not the Court's
holding50 but rather its approach and attitude toward the Securities Acts.
While discussing whether section 27 authorized an implied federal cause of
action for an alleged violation of section 14 (a), the Court made the following
open-ended statements and analogy, which are not limited to the proxy
sections: 60
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage litigation,
the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most
effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements.
We therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary
to make effective the congressional purpose.
It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief" where federally secured rights are invaded.
While the Court's conclusory approach leaves many questions unanswered,
its unanimous declarations clearly evince a broad and liberal approach to the
securities area. Since appropriate remedies must be fashioned to effectuate
the congressional purposes underlying the Securities Acts, it would seem that
such purposes would not be furthered by allowing broad and nebulous
common law defenses.
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of common law defenses to
legislative enactments of overriding public importance in Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corporation.-1 Although arising in an
antitrust context, Perma Life involved a private claim for relief under a
statute of public significance (antitrust) to which the defendants asserted a
common law defense (in pari delicto) .62 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants conspired to restrain and lessen competition in violation of the
antitrust laws. Both the district court and the court of appeals allowed the
defense of in pari delicto; the Supreme Court granted certiorari because such
rulings "seemed to threaten the effectiveness of the private action as a vital
means for enforcing the anti-trust policy of the United States .

*"63

and

reversed both courts on the basis of these "important public purposes."
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, used reasoning and language
applicable to the Securities Acts. The Court stated that no language in the
antitrust acts indicated a legislative intent to allow a broad common law
defense such as in pari delicto. After criticizing the doctrine's wide and inconsistent application, Justice Black then foreshadowed the holding by declaring
that the Court had "often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad
59. J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), held that §27 of the 1934 Act authorizes
a federal cause of action for rescission or damages to a corporate stockholder with respect
to a consumated merger that was authorized pursuant to the use of a proxy statement
alleged to contain false and misleading statements violative of §14(a) of the Act.
60. Id. at 432-33.
61. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id. at 136.
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common law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public
purposes."6 4 This declaration, when coupled with the Court's premise that
the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by assuring the constant
availability of private actions to deter violations, led inevitably to the conclusion that in pari delicto would not be allowed as a defense to antitrust
actions. The Court justified its decision on the basis of promoting the "overriding public policy in favor of competition."0 5 Even though this approach
might allow a morally reprehensible plaintiff to obtain a windfall gain, the
Court chose to foster "the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of
antitrust enforcement."6 However, such plaintiffs remained fully subject to
civil and criminal penalties for their own illegal conduct.
The Court's hostility to common law defenses undermining the effectiveness of private enforcement of antitrust "policy" was reflected both in its
holding that "in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects,
is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action" 07 and in its
subsequent statement, which intimated an alternative basis for barring an
uninnocent plaintiff:68
We need not decide however, whether such truly complete involvement and participation such as actively supporting the entire program,
participating in its formulation, and encouraging its continuation
64. Id. at 138-39.
65. Id. at 139.
66.

Id.

67. Id. at 140. The breakdown of the Court in Perma Life is as follows: Mr. Justice
Black delivered the majority opinion, speaking for seven members of the Court including
himself, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Fortas, and Marshall;
the latter three justices wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Harlan, speaking for
himself and Justice Stewart, concurred in part and dissented in part. In his concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice White argued that the in pari delicto defense was not applicable and
concluded that the decision would be "better made by hewing closer to the aims and
purposes" of the antitrust legislation. Id. at 143. He would deny recoveries where there
was substantially equal responsibility for the violation, thus turning the decision on the
issue of causation. Id. at 146. Justice Fortas argued that the in pari delicto defense was
not applicable to the instant case but indicated that it should be applicable in the limited
context where the parties were coadventurers or partners in the violative arrangements as
a whole. Id. at 147-48. Justice Marshall felt that the in pari delicto doctrine should be
applicable in the limited context where it was shown the "plaintiff actively participated in
the formation and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is substantially equally at
fault... " Id. at 148-49. In a partially dissenting opinion, Justices Harlan and Stewart
argued that in pari delicto, properly defined, should be applicable; they declared that plaintiffs truly in pari delicto "are those who have themselves violated the law in cooperation
with the defendant." Id. at 153. However, three exceptions to this doctrine were recognized:
(1) consent situations, (2) independent illegal actions, and (3) coercion situations. Id. at
154-55. Thus, the first five Justices named argued that in pari delicto was not applicable
to antitrust actions although a plaintiff's cause of action could be barred. Complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could be barred on some basis wholly
apart from the idea of in pari delicto, presumably a statutory policy basis. Compare, Note,
In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV. L. Pmv. 1241
(1965), with Ellis, In Defense of In Pari Delicto, 57 A.B.A.J. 346 (1970).

68. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968).
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in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from
the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action.
The statements in Perma Life, together with those in Capital Gains6 9 and
Joiner,70 indicate that the Supreme Court will subordinate common law
concepts to legislative policy, at least in areas of such public significance
as the regulation of business financing and free competition. Nonetheless,
while prohibiting the use of broad common law defenses in the context of
federal antitrust legislation, the Court hinted that liberality has its limits
and that, despite the overriding public purposes underlying remedial antitrust legislation, there will be some limited factual contexts (described only
generally)71. in which plaintiffs will be barred from recovery- presumably,
however, only upon policy grounds. At least one subsequent antitrust case
has looked beyond the apparent holding of Perma Life and barred plaintiff's
right to recovery essentially on policy grounds.72 The applicability of Perma
Life to the securities context is raised in the next section.
JUDICIAL REACTIONS AND THE PROBLEMS OF "UNINNOCENT LAMBS" IN THE
SECURITIES CONTEXT

Implying a private remedy from a statute is only one step in the process;
procedural and substantive limitations upon such a remedy must also be
defined. As one author has understated: "[T]he problem of setting limits on
implied remedies is particularly difficult under the various securities acts." 73
Regardless of such difficulties, the courts inevitably had to delineate the
rationales enunciated in cases such as Borak and Capital Gains and applied
to common law defenses in Perma Life. Two subsequent, important cases,
69. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
70. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
71. See note 67 supra.
72. In Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 292 F. Supp. 213, 218 (N.D. Ill.
1968), the court noted that at "first blush" the Supreme Court's holding in Perma Life
seemed to preclude the use of the in pari delicto defense in a civil antitrust suit but that
a closer look at the opinion as a whole allowed some sort of a bar.
73.

Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 H~Av. L. RFv.

285, 297 (1963). The author also made these interesting comments concerning implied remedies: "Two analytical theories have traditionally been advanced to explain the implication
of a civil cause of action from the violation of a statute. Under one view the statute either
directly sets or provides evidence of the standard of conduct required within the framework of an already existing cause of action. This view finds its most frequent application
in negligence actions through the maxim that reasonable men do not violate statutes and
in doctrines of prima facie and per se negligence. A second theory regards the statute as
declaring wrongful certain behavior, from which the court itself then creates a new cause
of action. This theory-requiring no closely related duty to the plaintiff in preexisting lawallows greater play for the judicial power....
"The right under a new cause of action requires definition - defenses, venue, and statute
of limitation; this problem is usually absent when only the standards of an existing cause
of action are altered. Also, a new cause of action implied from a federal statute creates a
federal right, but because there is no broad network of common law duties at the federal
level, the standard-setting rationale can generally lead only to a state right." Id. at 286-87.
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Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank 4 and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation,7
dealt expressly with the problems inherent in Perma Life. A third case,
Moscarelli v. StamM,7 6 is important because it recognizes the conceptual
impact of Borak and foreshadowed Serzysko.
Moscarelli was decided shortly after Perma Life 77 but did not consider
it, perhaps in part because no explicit common law defenses were asserted.
At the trial level, however, the defendants had asserted that the plaintiff's
"active participation" and conspiracy barred them from recovery and moved
for a summary judgment: 8 The court initially noted that although the primary purpose of margin requirements is macroeconomic and even though no
private civil remedy was explicitly provided for violating them, the relevant
report of the House of Representatives declared that one of the secondary
goals of margin requirements was to protect the small speculator by making
it impossible to spread himself too thinly.79 Relying principally upon Borak
the court concluded that the broad purposes of the 1934 Act justified implying a private right of action to enforce the margin requirements directly
created by the Act. However, as the court realized, the real difficulty arose
not from such implication but "in defining the nature and extent of liability
imposed, placing proper emphasis upon the primary purpose of the enactment."80
In response to the plaintiff's argument that liability for violations of the
margin requirements was absolute because the statute deemed small investors
incapable of protecting themselves, 8 ' the court noted that a statute was
construed as imposing strict liability only in exceptional circumstances. To
"permit a broker's customer, who conspires or aids and abets the broker in
violation of the provisions of section 7 (c), to recover his losses from his
broker, would defeat the very purpose of the section and economic considerations which underlie its enactment."8 2 Thus, in terms of priorities, the
court concluded that the fundamental statutory purpose of preventing
excessive speculation overrode the "byproduct" of protecting small investors.
However, rather than adjudicate such policy and economic considerations,
the court stressed the more familiar common law tort framework, stating that
it "follows that a broker's implied civil liability is not absolute but is subject
to the traditional tort concepts of causation and contributory negligence or

74. 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

396 U.S. 904 (1969).
75. 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968), afJ'd and petition for rehearing denied en banc,
412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
76. 288 F. Supp. 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
77. The opinion in Perma Life was delivered on June 10, 1968, 392 U. S. 184 (1968);
whereas the Moscarelli opinion was delivered on July 22, 1968, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y.

1968).
78. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
79. Id. at 458-59.
80. Id. at 459.
81. This argument derives from the rationale employed in Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
82. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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analogous conduct."s3 Thus, the court assumed that actions under sections
7 (c) and 29 (b), to which it applied the same reasoning, were tortious in
nature. Why such an analysis is required or necessary, as distinct from a policy
and economic oriented approach, was not explained.
Moscarelli set the stage for Serzysko,8 4 which considered in depth the
problem of barring a plaintiff's right to recovery under the 1934 Act because
of his wrongful conduct. The plaintiff, Serzysko, sued to recover damages
allegedly resulting from loans made to him by the defendant bank in violation of the federal margin requirements.85 The defendants contended inter
alia that: (1) the plaintiff was not within the class of persons entitled to
maintain an implied right of action for violation of the margin requirements
and (2) the plaintiff's conduct in connection with the loans was such as to
bar any recovery.30 After summarily holding that the "weight of opinion is
to the effect that a private cause of action is to be implied in the case of
a violation of the margin regulations, ' 87 the court discussed Remar v. Clayton
Securities,88 the leading case allowing an implied right of action under the
margin regulations. The court in Remar, after agreeing that no express

83.

Id. at 459-60.

84. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d
1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
85. The margin requirements are contained in 12 C.F.R. §§220-221 (1970). Section 220
is commonly called "Regulation T" and §221 is commonly called "Regulation U." Regulation T governs the extension of credit to a customer by a member of a National Exchange
or any broker or dealer transacting business with a member. Regulation U governs loans
by banks for the purpose of purchasing or carrying registered securities. "Carrying" is
defined as encompassing a loan made for the purpose of reducing or retiring indebtedness
incurred to purchase that stock. Id. §221.3 (b). Both Regulations prescribe minimum margin requirements referred to as maximum loan values. That is, a margin trader is a customer who purchases securities on credit and margin in the amount he deposits with his
broker to purchase such securities, the balance being advanced by a broker-dealer or other
lender. Under §7 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78g (1964). the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System was given authority and has subsequently regulated margins by setting (periodically) the maximum amount of credit that can be extended
for the purpose of purchasing securities. The basic purpose underlying the Federal
Reserve credit policy is "the advancement of the public interest by contributing to the
greatest extent possible to economic stability and growth." Id. §201.0. For more detailed
explanation see 2 L. Loss, SEcurmEs REmULATION 1239-76 (Supp. 1969); 5 L. Loss, SEcureTim REGULA ON 3260-3312 (Supp. 1969); Kelly & Webb, Credit and Securities; The Margin
Requirements, 24 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1969); Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for
Civil Liability, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1462 (1966); Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
Civil Remedies Based upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61
MicH. L. Rxv. 940 (1963).

86. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
87. Id. at 78. Accord, Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956); Moscarelli v.
Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Glickman v. Scheickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Remar v.
Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). Contra, Goodbody & Co., v. Penjaska
Corp., 8 Mich. App. 64, 153 N.W.2d 665 (1967); Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp.,
204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 910, 134 N.Y.S.2d 590
(1st Dep't 1954); Note, supra note 85, at 1461-71.
88. Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
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remedy was available to a person allegedly harmed under section 7 of the
1934 Act, declared its rationale for implying a federal claim for relief:89
The general principle regarding civil liability for violations of prohibitory statutes has been put with precision in Restatement, Torts,
§286. Broadly stated, the rule is that where defendant's violation of a
prohibitory statute has caused injury to plaintiff the latter has a right
of action if one of the purposes of the enactment was to protect
individual interests like the plaintiff's.
Then, noting that protection of the small speculator was one of the subsidiary
goals of margin regulation, the Remar court held that an implied right of
action for an alleged violation of such regulations does exist and is not
barred by the individual's participation per se as a borrower in the illegal
transaction since "the statute was passed for the benefit of people like plaintiff, and since the Legislature regarded him as incapable of protecting himself .... 90
However, Serzysko pointed out that the Restatement section cited in
Remar also included subsection (d), which qualified the broad rule in Remar
by declaring that a plaintiff may recover only if he "has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action."9 ' Furthermore,
the court stated that policy considerations differ regarding a "knowing"
violator of the law vis-h-vis an "innocent lamb." In the case of a knowledgeable participant in a transaction violative of the margin requirements, the
policy against excessive use of credit should override the subsidiary policy of
imposing the entire burden of compliance upon the lender for" 'these policies
cannot be reconciled by allowing the borrower to undo his contractual
obligations whenever they prove unfavorable."92 Because of the impracticality of determining relative "sophistication," the court decided that any
person showing he was an "investor-borrower" in connection with loans on
registered securities had the legal right to bring an action for alleged
damages. However, such a person could also be barred from recovery
because his conduct and his sophistication were deemed relevant factors in
93
making a determination on the merits.

89. Id. at 1017.
90. Id. The House of Representatives stated also that the "main purpose of section 7
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was to give a government credit agency an
effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources which
can be directed by speculation into the stock market." H.R. RFs. No. 1883, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. B (1984).
91. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court
reflects here the same fear of "recoupment of losses" suits as did the court in Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704-05 (1969).
92. The court is quoting from the Note, Federal Margin Requirements, supra note 85,
at 1482-88. The author of Note, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, note 85 supra, also concludes that the "inexperienced margin trader" in some cases should be protected but that
recovery should be denied to the "sophisticated trader who knowingly assumes the risk
of an inadequate margin." Id. at 953.
93. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Having thus granted an implied right of action, the court turned to the
problem of its substantive limitations and attempted to solve the problem by
relating the nature of the asserted claim for relief to the question of what
legal effect was to be accorded a person's wrongful conduct in connection with
the violation of a regulatory statute.04 The court then adopted the Remar
analysis, which treated a margin violation suit as an action in tort.95 The
applicability of traditional tort doctrines, such as contributory negligence
and lack of causation, together with the types of "disabling" conduct under
section 286 (d) of the Restatement of Torts, must then be considered. In this
context Supreme Court cases such as Borak and Perma Life became critically
relevant.9 0 The Serzysko court discussed both of these cases and concluded
that "a private cause of action for violation of a regulatory statute must be
considered in the light of the enforcement of such a statute."97 The court
then attempted to distinguish Perma Life on three bases: (1) the existence
of an express cause of action, (2) the availability of statutory civil and
criminal penalties against the plaintiffs as participating wrongdoers, and (3)
the active and knowing participation of the defendants in the alleged violations. The court concluded that none of the three factors present in Perma
Life existed in the instant case. 98 By such distinctions, the court possibly
sought the opportunity for a limited application of in pari delicto.
Having distinguished Perma Life, however, the court mentioned in pars
delicto but declared it inapplicable to the facts, focusing instead upon "supplementing the enforcement of the statute," which is accomplished "when
the rules applied in private actions are such as tend to encourage the
observance of the statute and to deter nonobservance of it."99 Looking to
the consequences of its holding, the court reasoned that allowing recovery by
a willful violator would probably encourage deception and thereby increase
nonobservance of the statute. To permit recovery by such wrongdoer would
in fact undermine the purposes of the margin requirements. In addition,
since effective statutory enforcement requires bilateral adherence to its tenets,
the court barred not only the plaintiffs's claim because of his conduct, but
also the defendant's counterclaim because of its lack of compliance with the
statutory mandates.109 Hence, wholly apart from any common law defenses,
a "bar" - call it what you will - to recovery was applied to any party contravening statutory policy.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
See text accompanying notes 56-72 supra.
Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Id. In Kuehnert, only factor (1)was different from Perma Life. See A. BROMBERG,
SECURrEs LAW; FRAuD-SEC RuLE 10-5, §§2.1-2.7, 8.1-11.8 (1969). Under this analysis
is thus not clear if Kuehnert would be distinguishable.
99. Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
100. Id. at 89-90. The court barred defendant's counterclaim for balance due on the
basis that its lack of due care in checking out the plaintiff's trustworthiness also violated
the spirit of the Regulations and that thus to allow recovery would similarly encourage
nonobservance of the statutory mandate. See Aubin v. H. Hentz & Co., 303 F,Supp. 1119,
1121 (S.D. Fla. 1969), wherein the court follows the tort view of Serzysko,
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Whether the Serzysko court would apply in pari delicto, if applicable, is
not dear. However, the court, keenly aware of the Perma Life rationale,
recognized the important principle that the tort concepts enunciated in
section 286 of the Restatement of Torts and applied in Remar must be considered in the light of what action would most properly supplement the
enforcement of the Securities Acts.
Approximately a year later, in Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation, the facts
of which have been noted, the plaintiff alleged in essence that he purchased
common stock of Texstar Corporation because of confidential information
given to him by the then president of Texstar, that this "inside" information
was false, and that his stock was subsequently sold at a loss when he was
unable to meet margin calls.011 At the district court level, defendants
responded that "because of the circumstances surrounding Kuehnert's acquisition of his stock, he cannot employ the applicable provisions of the Act
and Rule lOb-5 as a foundation to sustain the cause of action he attempts
to assert here."1o2 The court agreed, contending that "trading by insiders

based on material undisclosed information is a violation of lOb-5"13 and that
the 1934 Act "was enacted in part to afford protection to the ordinary
purchaser [that is, one without inside information] or seller of securities." 1°
The court defined an insider as one who has "access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone .. ."105
". The class of persons having
access to such nonpublic information via tips given by insiders were labeled
"tippees" and thrust within the penumbra of persons covered by rule l0b-5.10G
In considering the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district
court accepted all of the plaintiff's allegations as true. Upon such facts, the
court held that plaintiff was a tippee and ruled as a matter of law that lOb-5
was intended to protect only "the ordinary person who buys and sells securities based upon information generally available to the investing public" but
"not one that has access to or believes he has access to secret, material,
confidential, corporate information."07 Alternatively, the court held that
"the defense of in pari delicto asserted by defendants is good as against

101. 286 F. Supp. 340, 343 (S.D. Tex. 1968). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
102. Id.
103. ld. at 343-44.
104. Id. at 344. The court quoted from Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
105. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1968). The court's
definition of an "insider" is taken directly from the leading case of In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
106. The concept of the "tippee" extension of the insider liability doctrine may be said
to have been foreshadowed by Cady, but it was first enunciated clearly in Ross v. Licht,
263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), in which the court defined a tippee as a person
given information by insiders. The term "tippee" was apparently coined by Professor Loss
is 3 L. Loss, SECURrnEs REGULATION 1451 (Supp. 1969). See also id. at 3561-69 for an
excellent discussion of the implications of the tippee concept.
107. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340, 345 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
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Kuehnert, although because of the above holding no further discussion of
that doctrine and its applicability here is necessary."'0 8
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, which not only affirmed the district court's holdings but also held
applicable the common law defenses of in pari delicto and unclean hands.
The court sarcastically characterized the plaintiff as a "dupe" who believed
he was an insider wrongfully attempting to profit from secret inside facts.
The dispositive issue was articulated at multiple levels: "Is recovery in
private lOb-5 actions barred by unclean hands or by being in pari delicto?
If so, is an impure heart an equivalent?"' 10 9
Before reaching affirmative answers to both inquiries, the court sought
to distinguish Perma Life. Asserting that actual illegal conduct should bar
recovery although some exceptions might exist, such as in the antitrust
context, the court stated that Perma Life was not applicable to the Kuehnert
facts since the "degree of public interest" in private SEC violations was "not
comparable to that made apparent by the treble damage provision" and the
only question involved in the former concerned "accounting between joint
conspirators.""u 0 This is perhaps another way of stating the district court's
rationale that the purpose of the Securities Act is to protect only the "ordinary" purchaser or seller, not one who is tainted with inside information."'
The court of appeals then declared that Kuehnert clearly would have been
in pari delicto if he had in fact concealed material information from those
who sold him the Texstar securities. However, Kuehnert did not conceal
material information from his sellers because, given false information from
the defendant, Rhame, he knew nothing and "concealed nothing, and hence
108. Id.
109. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
110. Id. See the limited discussions of this question of "public interest" in Godfrey,
Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar To Recovery Under the Securities Acts: In Pari Delicto, 4
TEXAS L. REV. 181, 183 (1969); Note, Securities Regulations; Doctrines of In Pari Delicto
and Unclean Hands Helt to Bar 10 (b)5 Recovery by Tippee Against Corporate Insiders,

1969 DuKE L.J. 832, 835. Both articles point out the tenuousness of such a distinction. See
also Judge Godbold's vigorous dissent at the circuit court level in Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705-07 (5th Cir. 1969). The court in Kuehnert also asserts that its
conclusion is supported by the availability of the "unclean hands" defense in actions involving SEC proxy requirements, as in Gaudiosi v. Franklin, 166 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1958),
aff'd in part, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). It should be
noted that Gaudiosi was decided long before Borak, Capital Gains, and Perma Life. The

citations given in Gaudiosi refer to no defenses under the Securities Acts; they are almost
all patent cases, see 269 F.2d at 881 (3d Cir. 1959). Moreover, in a 1964 proxy case, a court
rejected the unclean hands maxim altogether on the ground that it "would produce the
illogic of leaving the shareholders unprotected when they have been doubly misled, stultifying the underlying purpose of the national securities laws. Where a public interest is at
stake, above the interests of the parties themselves, the protection of that paramount interest overcomes the judicial reluctance to assist a wrongdoer." Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1964). However, the court went on to state
that if "[b]oth sides are guilty .. .public policy and the legislative purpose are surely better
served by a fresh vote than by a refusal to act out of repugnance to unclean hands." Id. at
411. See also 2 L. Loss, supra note 85, at 955-56, 960-62; 5 L. Loss, supra note 85, at 2924.
111. See text accompanying notes 104, 107.
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did not defraud his vendors."'11 2 Thus, in a strict sense, Kuehnert and Rhame
were not in pari delicto even as to intention since, as the court assumed,
Rhame's only intention was to defraud Kuehnert whereas Kuehnert's only
intention was to defraud his vendors, an entirely different group of persons.
The ultimate question before the court then was: Should recovery be denied
because of a plaintiff's fraudulent intent or, as the court phrased it, an
"impure heart"? In response, the court construed the antifraud phrase "any
manipulative or deceptive device" 1 3 as encompassing all fraudulent conduct
in the securities context, whether successful or abortive."14 The plaintiff
intended to defraud his sellers but failed. Even if he could not technically
be characterized as in pari delicto with Rhame, the court declared that the
basic intent of both parties was to perpetrate fraud upon others. Therefore,
unclean hands, an equitable doctrine looking to one's intent, was held
applicable. Utilizing intellectual gymnastics, the court covered any possible
inapplicability of in pari delicto by applying the unclean hands defense as
well on the basis of fraudulent intent. In justification the court declared
that even though plaintiff was seeking only a remedy at law -money damages under rule lOb-5 - rather than equitable relief, unclean hands was
applicable since it expressed "a general principle equally suited to damage
actions.""'s
These discussions of ancient common law doctrines appear unnecessary
to a sound decision, for the application of such doctrines is undercut by the
Supreme Court cases discussed previously. Especially in light of Perma Life,
it would seem that the doctrine of unclean hands should suffer the same fate
as did in pari delicto. These gyrations seem even more irrelevant when recalling that the Kuehnert court began its analysis by stating that the "guiding
112. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
113. See note 39 supra wherein §10 and rule lOb-5 are quoted.
114. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
115. Id. at 704. See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 410
(N.D. fI1. 1964); 4 J. POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §1368, at 989 (5th ed. 1941). But cf.
Straley v. Universal Uranium & Mining Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961). In Union Pac.
R.R. the court cited Z. CHArEE, SOME PROBLEMS Or EQurry 94 (1950), as its basis. In his
article on unclean hands published shortly before the book, Professor Chafee, after exhaustive analysis, concluded that the so-called "clean hands" defense is simply a picturesque
phrase applied by equity courts to a general principle applicable to suits for specified
relief (equity) and to damage actions (law), the principle being that a plaintiff's fault is
often an important element in the judicial settlement of disputes, as well as the defendant's
fault. Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REv. 877, 1065, 1091-92
(1949). See also 2 J. PosERoy, supra note 115, at 402c, in which the author states that the
maxim of "clean hands" is applicable in various situations where relief is sought in courts
of equity in respect to corporations and stock transactions. At 404 he states: "[i]t is not
along fraud or illegality which will prevent a suitor from entering a court of equity; any
really unconscientious conduct, connected with the controversy to which he is a party, will
repel him from the forum whose very foundation is good conscience. . . . [Under this
maxim, any willful act in regard to the matter in litigation, which would be condemned and
pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded men, will be sufficient to make the
hands of the applicant unclean." It was the seemingly illimitable broadness of this
maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean bands," which provoked
Professor Chafee's article.
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principle is one of policy."'1 6 As a matter of legislative policy, sound reasoning, and apart from any case precedent, these common law doctrines should
be excluded to avoid undue confusion and possible misapplication in the
context of the federal securities acts.
Apparently, the Kuehnert court itself was not even thoroughly convinced
by its own arguments. After concluding that it had the discretion to apply
the defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto, the court based its final
determination upon a policy-oriented evaluation of "which decision will have
the better consequences in promoting the objective of the securities laws
by increasing the protection to be afforded the investing public."'1 7 This
is the critical inquiry. It should not be obfuscated by common law concepts
that add nothing to the analysis. As the court stated: "[C]ommon law technicalities are to be avoided ...not merely in judging the plaintiff's claim
but also in assessing defendant's responses.""' 8 Thus, while avoiding common
law technicalities, the court balanced the considerations for and against in
pari delicto and unclean hands against the plaintiff. Declaring that deterrent
legal pressures against corporate insiders already existed and that tippees
should not be allowed enforceable warranties that their secret information
is true, the court held that such tippees "who present the same threat to
the investing public as do insiders themselves, should be offered appropriate
discouragement.""1 9 The better choice, the court reasoned, was to adopt a
hands-off policy and thus forewarn tippees that action upon fraudulent
inside information will foreclose any recoupment of losses against the insiders.
Why did the circuit court include both the common law and legislative
policy analyses? The district court had separated the two approaches, resting
its decision clearly upon legislative intent while merely noting the alternative
defense of in pari delicto.120 The appellee's brief to the circuit court clearly
12
separated the two defenses, presenting them as two distinct arguments.
Since the circuit court conditioned the application of the common law defenses upon what decision would best promote the purposes of the securities
laws, why should such common law concepts be considered in any way other
than an analogies helping to buttress the policy decision? Why utilize and rest
a decision upon such nebulous concepts if in fact it rests upon completely
different considerations?
What tentative conclusions can be reached from these cases? The court
in Moscarelli, relying upon tort concepts, concluded that the primary con116.
117.
118.

Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 704-05.

119. Id. at 705.
120. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340, 345 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
121. Brief for Appellee, Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). In
their brief the appellees framed their major argument in terms of the opinion whether
the plaintiff was among the class of persons entitled to the protection of rule lob-5. Their
secondary argument was phrased in terms of whether the plaintiff's wrongful conduct in
purchasing Texstar's securities on the basis of secret, confidential information is violative
of the very statute and rule (rule lOb-5) under which he seeks relief and, thus, whether
the plaintiff should be barred from recovery by the doctrines of in pari delicto and
"unclean hands." Id. at 2, 10-22.
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gressional purpose of the margin requirements was to control speculation in
securities, not to protect investors absolutely. A broker's implied civil liability, therefore, was subject to the traditional tort defenses of contributory
negligence and lack of causation. The analysis in Moscarelli is consistent in
allowing conventional tort defenses to a judicially implied tortious right of
action. However, the analysis should center not upon customary tort concepts
but rather upon an evaluation of the legal and economic effects of a given
holding in relation to effective furtherance of the securities laws. There is no
incompatability with individual justice in such an approach since each case
will be decided upon its facts and may be limited to such. The court in
Serzysko seemed to view section 286 (d) of the Restatement of Torts as
embodying a broad "bar" concept analogous to common law doctrines such
as estoppel and in pari delicto. However such concept might be verbalized,
the court concluded that the rationales of Borak and Perma Life dictated that
private causes of action must be considered in light of enforcement of the
Acts. Regardless of their applicability, these common law defenses must be
subordinated to determining what holding will tend to encourage the observance of the Acts and deter nonobservance of them. Furthermore, this analysis
must be applied equally to the claims of all parties to the action. Thus,
Serzysko goes beyond Moscarelli in explicitly subordinating common law
concepts to considerations of statutory enforcement and policy. Finally, in
Kuehnert, the district court stressed a limited analysis of statutory intent
whereas the court of appeals expressly framed the issue and its holding in
terms of the applicability vel non of common law defenses, even though their
ultimate application rested upon a policy inquiry. The court of appeals
seems thus to have underemphasized the Supreme Court philosophies expressed in Capital Gains and Perma Life; that is, a court's decision in the
securities context should stress policy evaluations made in the light of statutory goals and should not be muddled by nebulous and confusing concepts
beyond the scope of such legislation. Once such defenses are allowed, as they
now have been, they will be asserted in other areas involving the Securities
Acts such as in margin requirements suits. Such defenses could easily sidetrack the critical inquiries, increase expenses, and unnecessarily waste the
time of the parties and courts. Our courts should not risk inequities, misapplication of national policies, and other social costs when adequate and
effective policy grounds for barring a plaintiff because of his wrongful conduct
already exist. To allow such broad common law barriers to relief where a
private claim for relief serves important public purposes is neither necessary
nor appropriate.
CONCLUSION

Thus, the three final questions regarding the assertion of common law
defenses to claims under the 1934 Act (and possibly to claims under any of
the Securities Acts) are: What is the present state of the law? What should
the law be? And what analysis and factors should be relevant in future cases?
Presently, a plaintiff's right to recovery under the 1934 Act may be barred
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss1/1

22

DEFENSES
OF COMMON
Bell: How to
BarVALDITY
an Uninnocent
Investor--The
Validity of Common Law Def
THE

because of his wrongful conduct on the basis of tort concepts, broad common
law maxims such as unclean hands and in pari delicto, or because of policy
reasons. These defenses probably will be asserted as a matter of course
where seemingly applicable to the facts regardless of the particular section
of the 1934 Act involved. Application of familiar tort doctrines is a judicial
method often employed to articulate and justify implication of a private
right of action.1 22 However, barring a plaintiff because of his wrongful conduct when he sues under regulatory legislation of overriding public and
economic importance should not be dependent solely upon common law tort
concepts that were developed primarily to adjudicate controversies between
private individuals. Barring a plaintiff upon ill-defined common law maxims
such as unclean hands and in pari delicto tends to further confuse and misdirect a sound of conscious application of the securities laws in accordance
with their avowed purposes and policies.
Because of these reasons and others developed throughout this article,
such common law defenses should not be applied to bar a plaintiff's right to
recovery when he is suing for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The basis of a decision barring plaintiff's recovery should rest
upon an evaluation of the interests involved and consequences upon statutory enforcement. While common law ideas should have their proper place
as supportive analogies to legislative policy considerations, they should be
clearly subordinated and liberally construed to help effectuate the remedial
purposes of the securities laws. This conclusion is derived from and consistent
with the rationales ennunciated in Borak, Capital Gains, and Perma Life eliminating possible confusion, injustice, and other social costs in the application of the Securities Acts. Furthermore, this conclusion does not preclude
attainment of the desired results since an "actively participating" plaintiff
can be barred from recovery on a policy basis. Therefore, the exclusion of
these broad common law defenses, amorphous and misleading, increases the
protection of the investing public and sound effectuation of the securities
laws.
Factors relevant in determining how best to further the legislative purposes of the Securities Acts when it is asserted that a party should be barred
from recovery because of his wrongful conduct are:
12 3
(1) the specific section (and rule) involved;

122. The leading securities case utilizing this approach is Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1947) (on
the merits). The theory was elucidated in Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27
HAmv. L. REv. 317 (1914). See also Note, Liability Under Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARV.
L. REv. 858 (1948); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARv. L. R.v. 285 (1963).

123. A particularistic analysis of the statute or rule involved should be made since
there might be some variation from the major thrusts of the securities laws. However, this
should not be overdone. These statements should be carefully considered in connection
with the earlier noted premises that the "keystone of the entire structure of Federal
securities legislation is disclosure." REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuRrnEs MARKETS or T E
SECURrrIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1 (1963):
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(2) the "person" (individual, corporation or other business entity)
or classes of persons affected;124
(3) the type of action;1 25 and
26
(4) the party's "active participation" in the alleged violation.1
While this approach is no panacea, it forces a careful evaluation of the
rationales underlying the Securities Acts, relevant court decisions, and the
behavioral implications of a given holding (legal, economic, and sociological).
Its purpose is to help a court reach the soundest decision possible upon the
facts consistent with the overriding goal of protecting the investing public
from dishonesty in the securities marketplace.
"There is a danger in discussing civil liability in connection with the Securities Act that both
the purpose of the Act and the emphasis of the discussion will be misunderstood. It is not
the object of the Act simply to provide a legal remedy for the investor who has bought
securities upon a false representation to compensate him for a loss incurred. Even the
provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely preventive rather than redressive.
Both in the extent of liability imposed-the variety of persons to whom the liability is
attached, the loser of the liability, and the person in whose favor it lies-and in the
limitations of the amounts recoverable, the in terrorem function of the Act is evidenced.
But even this purpose of securing preventive vigilance and caution on the part of the
persons concerned is only coordinate with, or probably subordinate to another object. The
Act seeks not only to secure accuracy in the information that is volunteered to investors
but also, and perhaps more especially, to complete the disclosure of significant matters
which were heretofore rarely, if ever, disclosed. Civil liability is imposed largely as one
appropriate means of accomplishing these ends, not as the end itself, or, on the other
hand, as the only means. While, then, discussion of the Act may property be directed
to the different provisions separately, it is apt to be misleading, and more covertly disingenuous if the principal objectives are not constantly pushed to the front." Shulman,
Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YArE LJ. 227 (1933) (emphasis added). While
these remarks were made in reference to the 1933 Act, their relevancy to the 1934 Act is
apparent.
See Godfrey, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar To Recovery Under the Securities Acts: In
Pari Delicto, 48 TXSs L. Rxv. 181 (1969), wherein the author concludes that Kuehnert
establishes the validity of the in pari delicto defense to bar a recovery under the Securities
Acts and then goes on to suggest that a court's discretion in the application of such defense should be tempered by consideration of (1) the relationship of plaintiff's conduct to
his asserted injury; (2) factors, if any, peculiar to the specific securities violation that
plaintiff is alleging; and (3)the capacity in which plaintiff is suing and the effect of
barring his claim on the rights of innocent third parties. The analysis suggested does
not focus upon the comparative guilt of the plaintiff vis-4-vis the defendant as a factor
but rather emphasizes the plaintiff's active participation in relation to congressional intent.
As the article notes, the in pari delicto evaluation is "highly subjective, for obvious reasons."
Id. at 184 n.18. See also id. at 183 for limited discussion of Perma Life.
124. The court of appeals does this in Kuehnert by considering the effects of its decision
upon claimants of the status or characterization involved in the case before it (insiders,
tippees), defendants of the type involved (insiders), and the investing public. Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1969).
125. Thus, even though a plaintiff may be guilty of misconduct, his claim should not
be barred in a derivative or class action-although he himself might be barred from any
recovery. See Godfrey, note 128 supra, at 195-97.
126. See text accompanying note 20 supra. The concept of barring recovery because of
misconduct should be applied to both parties. Thus, the defendant was barred from recovery in Serzysko. Hence, the emphasis in such a policy or interests analysis is not per
se the claims of the parties but rather the soundest application of the securities laws.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss1/1

24

